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steThe Importance of Others: 




Ethics, 130(4): 555-87.  
 
Abstract. Marx’s vision of unalienated production is often thought to be subject to 
decisive objections. This paper argues that these objections rely on a 
misinterpretation of Marx’s position. It provides a new interpretation of Marx’s 
vision of unalienated production. Unlike another well-known account, it suggests 
that unalienated production involves realizing oneself through providing others 
with the goods and services they need for their self-realization. It argues that this 
view is appealing and that it offers a more successful response to objections than 
previous interpretations. In doing so, it hopes to put Marx’s concern with alienation 
and non-alienation back on the table.  
1. Introduction 
In his 1844 writings Karl Marx famously describes workers under capitalism as 
suffering from four aspects of alienation: Workers are alienated 1) from the 
product of their labor; 2) from their productive activity; 3) from their species-
being; and 4) from other individuals.1 As well as the negative account of alienated 
labor, the 1844 writings also contain a positive vision of unalienated production 
under communism. In short, this vision describes a society in which individuals 
achieve self-realization through others – by helping them satisfy their needs.2 
For the most part philosophers have been unsympathetic to Marx’s thought on 
this topic.3 Rawls’s discussion was ambiguous. On the one hand, Rawls echoes 
 
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Istanbul Technical University, Bilkent 
University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Association for Social and Political Philosophy 
conference and the Marx & Philosophy Society work in progress seminar. For very helpful 
comments and discussion, I would like to thank Chris Bennett, Daniel Brudney, Andrew Chitty, 
Faik Kurtulmuş, David Leopold, Meade McCloughan, Sean Sayers, Tony Smith, Daniel Viehoff, and 
Bill Wringe. I am also very grateful to two anonymous referees and three associate editors for 
Ethics for very detailed and insightful reports on an earlier draft of this paper, which led to 
significant improvements. 
1 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in MECW vol. 3, 270-282. All 
references to Marx’s writings are to the Marx-Engels Collected Works (MECW), (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1975-2004).  
2 Marx, “Comments on James Mill, Éléments D’économie Politique,” in MECW vol. 3, 227-228.  
3 An important exception is Paul Gomberg’s work on contributive justice. Gomberg draws on 
Marx to defend an account of the human flourishing that argues 1) that it is good to develop one’s 
abilities; 2) that it is good to contribute one’s abilities in ways that benefit others; and 3) that it 
is good to be esteemed by others for one’s contribution. According to Gomberg, we should recast 
equality of opportunity as equal opportunity to perform complex labor that realizes this 
constellation of goods. And for Gomberg, this necessitates the sharing of routine labor. See 
Gomberg, How to Make Opportunity Equal: Race and Contributive Justice (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007), and “Work,” in The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018).  
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Marx when he writes that “no one need be servilely dependent on others and be 
made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are 
deadening to human thought and sensibility.”4  On the other hand, however, 
Rawls provides no institutional guarantee that alienated labor will be eliminated. 
Nozick, by contrast, argues that meaningful work is compatible with capitalism: 
if people value meaningful work, then workers could take a pay cut to perform 
it, or consumers could pay more for goods that are produced in less efficient but 
more meaningful ways.5 Similarly, liberal egalitarians, such as Richard Arneson 
and Will Kymlicka, argue that we should not abolish alienated labor, but leave 
people free to trade the quality of their work for other things they value, such as 
higher wages or better leisure.6 
One might have expected Marx’s thought on alienated labor and unalienated 
production to receive more sympathetic discussion in the writings of the 
analytical Marxists. However, they had little to say about alienation.7 They 
generally avoided this side of Marx’s thought in favor of discussion of history, 
justice, exploitation and class. Furthermore, what little they did write was quite 
critical.8  Like the liberal and libertarian philosophers discussed above, the 
analytical Marxists generally accepted the conclusion that a “defense of 
nonalienation seems remote.”9   
In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the topic of meaningful 
work, with a number of philosophers arguing that meaningful work should be 
included among the list of goods to which distributive justice applies.10 Support 
for this view has not, however, led to a rehabilitation of Marx’s vision of 
unalienated production. In fact, far from defending Marx, recent advocates of 
meaningful work have tended to distance their view from Marx’s.11 While 
 
4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice rev edn. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 424.  
5 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 246-250.  
6 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 186-192; Richard J. Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism,” Ethics 97, no. 3 
(1987): 517-545.  
7 An exception is Jon Elster; see Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 521-528; and “Self-realisation in work and politics: the Marxist conception of the 
good life,” in Alternatives to Capitalism, eds. Jon Elster and Karl Ove Moene (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). As I shall argue below, however, Elster misinterprets Marx’s 
views on alienation and non-alienation. Perhaps not surprisingly, Marx’s thought on alienation 
and non-alienation has been more extensively discussed by Hegelian Marxists. See, e.g., 
Christopher J. Arthur, Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986); István Mészáros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin Press, 1970);  and 
Sean Sayers, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011). These works have not, however, brought Marx into contact with contemporary political 
philosophy.    
8  See, e.g., John E. Roemer, “Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 1, no. 1 (1985): 30-65; G.A. Cohen, “Reconsidering Historical Materialism,” in History, 
Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 142-144.   
9 Roemer, “Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?,” 52.  
10 See, e.g., Russell Muirhead, Just Work (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Beate 
Roessler, “Meaningful Work: Arguments from Autonomy,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, 
no. 1 (2012): 71-93; Samuel Arnold, “The Difference Principle at Work,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012): 94-118.  
11 For instance, Roessler goes out of her way to distinguish her position from Marx’s view that 
advocates a “need for human self-realization through and in work.” (Roessler “Meaningful Work,” 
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meaningful work has been discussed and defended, then, Marx’s vision of 
unalienated production has not.  
Why have philosophers been unpersuaded by Marx’s arguments, avoided his 
concerns with alienation, or gone out of their way to distance their advocacy of 
ideals from those put forward by Marx? I suspect that this is because Marx’s 
vision of unalienated production is thought to be subject to decisive objections. 
In what follows, however, I argue that these objections often rely on a 
misinterpretation of Marx’s position. I provide a new interpretation of Marx’s 
vision of unalienated production. Unlike some other well-known accounts,12 my 
interpretation suggests that unalienated production involves realizing oneself 
through providing others with the goods and services they need for their self-
realization. I argue that this interpretation is appealing and that it provides a 
more successful response to objections than previous interpretations: while 
some of the objections continue to have force, they are not decisive in the way 
that many readers have supposed. Indeed, we shall see that the most important 
objections to Marx’s vision of unalienated production raise hard open questions. 
These include questions about markets, about whether unalienated production 
is compatible with an efficient organization of production, and about whether 
unalienated production requires unacceptable restrictions on freedom. 
Questions of this kind have not been central to contemporary political 
philosophy. By focusing on Marx’s vision of unalienated production, I hope to put 
them back on the table and invite further discussion.13  
Before I continue, a clarification about terminology.  As may already be clear, 
Marx talks about alienated labor and “truly human” – or as I shall call it here 
“unalienated” – production, whereas contemporary political philosophers 
 
74). Earlier discussions of meaningful work were, by contrast, somewhat more sympathetic to 
Marx. See, e.g., Adina Schwartz, “Meaningful Work,” Ethics 92, no. 4 (1982): 634-646.  
12 Especially Jon Elster’s. I discuss Elster’s interpretation in the next section. The closest 
interpretation to my own is Daniel Brudney’s. See Brudney, Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy, 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). While I am indebted to Brudney, there are also 
some important differences between our interpretations, which I shall register in what follows.  
13 Some of the themes of this essay are anticipated by G.A. Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). There, Cohen identifies socialism with a two-
fold principle of community. The first is communal solidarity:  this obtains when “people care 
about, and, where necessary and possible, care for, one another, and, too, care that they care 
about one another.” (34-5).  The second is community reciprocity: “the anti-market principle 
according to which I serve you not because of what I can get in return by doing so but because 
you need or want my service, and you, for the same reason, serve me.” (39). Cohen does not cite 
Marx, but the resonances between his two principles of community and the ideas expressed in 
the “Comments” are striking.  
However, there is a key respect in which my account departs from Cohen’s. On my 
interpretation of Marx, the primary good of socialism is that it will enable individuals to lead the 
good life. This idea is largely absent from Why Not Socialism? When he first introduces the 
camping trip, Cohen says that people share the common aim of having a “good time” (3), and that 
they are concerned with the “opportunity to flourish” (4). But the idea that socialism is desirable 
because it will enable people to lead the good life plays no – or at least very little – role in the 
subsequent discussion. Rather, Cohen’s call for socialism is primarily made in terms of 
distributive equality. Although I have no space to make the argument here, I believe that Cohen’s 
identification of socialism with distributive equality is a mistake. To my mind, Marx’s view 
represents a more appealing basis for socialist political philosophy.  
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typically speak about meaningless and meaningful work. The application of these 
terms to Marx can be misleading. For Marx, alienated labor and unalienated 
production are technical terms. In particular, alienated labor is not just 
intrinsically uninteresting work – what I shall call drudgery – and unalienated 
production is not just whatever one happens to find subjectively meaningful. 
These distinctions will become important in my reply to Marx’s critics.   
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin (§2) by discussing some criticisms of a 
previous interpretation of unalienated production. I then provide (§3) a new 
interpretation of Marx’s vision of unalienated production. Next (§4), I develop 
this interpretation and discuss some of its key implications. Finally, (§5), I show 
how my interpretation responds to the objections with which I began.  
2. Objections to Marx’s Vision of Unalienated Production  
Before we examine the objections, we need a formulation of the vision that was 
their target. Among analytical Marxists, the idea of unalienated production has 
been discussed in most detail by Jon Elster, and so I focus on his account here. 
According to Elster, self-realization through unalienated production involves 
“the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers and abilities of 
the individual.”14 This definition has a number of aspects, and generates several 
objections, which I shall now consider. I then provide an alternative 
interpretation of Marx on unalienated production. This crucially involves the 
idea – absent from Elster’s definition15 – that such work satisfies and is intended 
to satisfy others’ needs.  
(i) Full Development. – To begin with, self-realization consists in what Elster calls 
the “full development” of the individual’s abilities. According to Marx, 
capitalism’s relentless pursuit of profit leads to an intensification of the division 
of labor that restricts workers to machine-like type of activity that is inimical to 
the full development of their abilities. In a communist society, by contrast, the 
division of labor is abolished, and individuals develop their abilities in an all-
round way. According to Elster and other critics, however, the idea of full 
development represents an infeasible and not necessarily desirable conception 
of self-realization.16 The conception is infeasible because given the finitude of 
human life, full development is a practical impossibility; and it is not necessarily 
desirable because it overlooks the fact that someone who performs many 
different activities will not do any of them very well.  
 (ii) Free Development. – In Elster’s view, self-realization also consists in the “free 
development” of the individual’s abilities. In capitalist society workers have little 
choice about the work they perform: they must accept whatever job is on offer. 
In a communist society, by contrast, workers choose which abilities to develop. 
While free development is seen as more plausible than full development, it is also 
 
14 Elster, “Self-realisation in work and politics,” 131. 
15 Elster rejects the vision of unalienated production I defend here as “unrealistic”; see “Self-
realisation in work and politics,” 151-152.  
16 See, e.g., Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 521-522; G.A. Cohen, “Reconsidering Historical 
Materialism,” 142-144.   
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said to face a serious problem.17 For Marx never explains how everyone’s work 
can be freely chosen and yet cumulatively generate the right quantity and variety 
of goods and services that society requires. As Daniel Brudney puts it, Marx’s 
vision of unalienated production faces “the obvious coordination problem of how 
to ensure that while each produces as she pleases, together we generate the right 
mix of socially necessary outputs.”18  
(iii) Alienated Labor. – In Elster’s view, Marx values communism primarily 
because he thought it would enable the self-realization of all individuals. This is 
an appealing ideal. But, absent enormous technological advancement (of which I 
shall say more in the next paragraph), it is not feasible. The problem is that a 
good deal of work required for social reproduction “offers limited scope for the 
kind of self-realization Marx had in mind.”19 Such work is inescapably repetitive 
and boring, physically exhausting, or simply unpleasant on account of the 
conditions under which it must be performed (think, for example, of the work 
involved maintaining a sewer). It is, in other words, inherently alienating. Marx 
believed that alienated labor will be eliminated under communism. But the truth 
is that it will be a feature of all modes of production.  
 (iv) Abundance. – According to Elster and other critics, Marx did not think the 
problem identified in the foregoing paragraph would occur because he thought 
that a communist society will be one of enormous abundance. The basic idea is 
that background conditions of abundance, brought about by technological 
advance, ensure that no one must deploy their abilities on some socially 
necessary but inherently unfulfilling task. Thus, abundance makes the full and 
free development of human abilities possible. However, the premise of 
abundance is unreasonable.20 For the finitude of natural resources, coupled with 
the tendency for human needs to increase over time, means that abundance will 
never be in prospect. As G.A. Cohen puts it, Marx's view represents an 
“extravagant, pre-green, materialist optimism” that we can no longer sustain 
today “because the planet earth rebels: its resources turn out to be not lavish 
enough for continuous growth.”21  
(v) Productivism. – According to some commentators, Marx was committed to 
productivism, the view that unalienated production can only be achieved in 
material production.22 According to this interpretation, Marx held that human 
beings are fundamentally transformers of the natural world, and that this 
ongoing transformation of nature constitutes human self-realization. However, 
this emphasis on material production is too restricted. We can achieve self-
 
17 See, e.g., Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 523; Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy, 174.  
18 Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy, 174.  
19 Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 523.  
20 See, e.g., Elster, Making Sense of Marx, 525; G.A. Cohen, Self–Ownership, Freedom and Equality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 10-11; Peter Singer, Marx: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 84.  
21 G.A. Cohen, Self–Ownership, Freedom and Equality, 127-128. 
22 This claim is central to Daniel Brudney’s interpretation of the early Marx; see Marx’s Attempt 
to Leave Philosophy, 160-168; and “Two Marxian Themes: The Alienation of Labor and the 
Linkage Thesis,” in Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy: Freedom, Recognition and 
Human Flourishing, ed. Jan Kandiyali (Routledge: London and New York, 2018).  
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realization in various ways, it is said. Material production is one way, but there 
are many others. It is, in short, implausible to pick out material production as 
having greater significance than other types of work that can also be vehicles for 
self-realization.   
(vi) Sexism. – Another objection, which is related to the previous one, comes from 
the feminist tradition. It is that Marx’s vision of unalienated production is 
sexist.23 In particular, it has been claimed that Marx interprets unalienated 
production “to mean primarily the production and exchange of objects” – the 
kind of work that has been traditionally performed by men. Consequently, he is 
said to exclude the work which has been traditionally performed by women, such 
as housework, childcare and care work, from the category of unalienated 
production. Far from being a gender-neutral theory, then, Marx’s vision of 
unalienated production is androcentric and gender-biased.  
(vii) A Liberal Objection. – The final objection comes from liberalism. It targets 
not Marx’s vision of unalienated production, but his view that its implementation 
represents a desirable goal.24  The key point is that a number of goods conflict 
with unalienated production, such as leisure activities, the consumption of 
various goods and services, commitments to family and friends, and many more 
besides.25 Some people value unalienated production, but others do not. If they 
were given the choice, they would prefer to trade unalienated production for 
more of these other goods. For example, if they could achieve the resources they 
need to play tennis by performing two hours of alienated labor as opposed to 
four hours of unalienated production, they might prefer alienated labor to 
unalienated production. As such, “a prohibition on alienated labor 
would…unfairly privilege some people [who have a taste for unalienated 
production] over others [who do not].”26  To be sure, liberal egalitarians do not 
defend the current distribution of work under capitalism. But, in their view, we 
should not respond to this problem by trying to bring about unalienated 
production for all, since not everyone wants unalienated production. Rather, we 
should bring about a fairer distribution of resources that people bring to the 
market, and then leave people free to pursue their own preferred mix of work, 
leisure and consumption. 
So much for my preliminary discussion of these criticisms. More will be said 
about them in section §4, where I will show how my interpretation offers lines 
of response to them.  
 
23 See, e.g., Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1983), ch.4; Diemut Bubeck, Care, Gender, and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
ch.1; Mary O’Brien The Politics of Reproduction (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 168-
184.  
24 See, e.g., Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 186-192; Arneson, “Meaningful Work 
and Market Socialism,” 528-529. In what follows I focus primarily on Kymlicka’s version of this 
objection.   
25 This is a partial list. In “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism,” Arneson lists 17 different 
goods that can conflict with unalienated production.   
26 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 193.  
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3. Marx’s Vision of Unalienated Production 
I now turn to Marx’s vision of unalienated production. Before I put forward my 
interpretation, I start by saying something about its negative counterpart: the 
idea of alienated labor.  
3.1. Alienated Labor. – As I said in the Introduction, Marx describes workers as 
suffering from four aspects of alienated labor. As these are well known, I will be 
brief. First, workers are alienated from the product of their labor. In capitalist 
society workers create products they neither own nor control. But more than 
that, workers simultaneously produce – or perhaps better to say, reproduce – a 
mode of production that is antithetical to their deepest needs, including their 
need for unalienated production. Far from furthering ends they affirm, their 
labor under capitalism reproduces an alien system that dominates them. Second, 
workers are alienated from their productive activity. Far from being a fulfilling 
activity through which the worker enjoys the exercise and development of his 
individuality, labor under capitalism “mortifies his body and ruins his mind.”27 
As such, it is only performed out of economic necessity. For this reason, Marx 
describes such labor as not free “but coerced; it is forced labor.”28  Third, workers 
are alienated from their species-being. Humans are capable of working in free, 
conscious, creative and social ways, but under capitalism they work in stultifying 
ways that are opposed to their nature, so understood. Finally, workers are 
alienated from other individuals. Part of what Marx has in mind here is the 
alienation of workers from capitalists. But as we shall see, he is equally 
concerned with how producers and consumers typically view each other, not as 
contributors to one another’s flourishing, but as mere means for the achievement 
of their egoistic ends.29  
More could be said about alienated labor. The point I want to emphasize here is 
that Marx's critique of alienated labor is not merely a critique of drudgery, by 
which I mean labor that does not involve self-realization, the exercise, 
development and manifestation of one’s powers and capacities. To be sure, 
alienated labor involves drudgery, but it involves more than that. As I shall 
explain later, alienated labor also involves workers not having the motivation of 
satisfying another’s needs, not having their labor appreciated by others, and not 
performing their labor freely. Furthermore, not all drudgery is alienated. For 
example, cleaning brushes and palettes after painting is drudgery, but it is not 
alienated labor because it is a constitutive part of a potentially unalienated 
activity. Washing dishes is a paradigm of drudgery but it is not alienated labor if 
it contributes to and is intended to contribute to the satisfaction of another’s 
needs, if the other feels grateful for you doing it, and if it is performed freely. 
Indeed, drudgery – in contrast to alienated labor – need not lack all value to the 
person performing it.  
This distinction between alienated labor and drudgery is important. As we have 
seen, one objection to Marx’s vision of unalienated production is that it is 
 
27 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 274. 
28 Ibid., 274.  
29 Marx, “Comments,” 225.  
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implausible to think that alienated labor could be overcome under communism. 
However, once we see that alienated labor is a not a catch-all for every type of 
drudgery, but a particular, and, in Marx’s view, especially pernicious evil, the 
claim that communist society will overcome alienated labor is no longer 
obviously implausible. For it now follows that a society could overcome alienated 
labor and yet still contain much drudgery.30 Of course, one might object that it is 
difficult to see how the persistence of a significant amount of drudgery is 
compatible with unalienated production. As we shall see, however, Marx has 
other resources at his disposal with which to respond to this objection.  
3.2. Unalienated Production. – I now turn to the positive vision of unalienated 
production.  I begin by quoting what I take to be Marx’s most promising account, 
the concluding passage of his 1844 “Comments on James Mill” (hereafter 
“Comments”). There, Marx invites the reader to imagine that we had “produced 
as human beings”, which is to say, in an unalienated fashion under communism. 
In that event, writes Marx, 
“1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific 
character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of 
my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would 
have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, 
visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your 
enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both 
of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, 
of having objectified man’s essential nature [Wesen], and of having thus 
created an object corresponding to the needs of another man’s essential 
nature. 3) I would have been for you the mediator [der Mittler] between 
you and the species, and therefore would become recognized and felt by 
you yourself as a completion [Ergänzung] of your own essential nature 
and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself 
to be confirmed both in your thought and your love. 4) In the individual 
expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of 
your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly 
confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal 
nature.”31 
As with the account of alienated labor, Marx’s description of unalienated 
production contains four elements. The first concerns the individual’s self-
realization. This has two aspects. First, the worker is said to find the activity of 
 
30 The famous discussion of the “realm of necessity” in the third volume of Capital is relevant 
here. There, Marx admits that labor determined by “necessity and mundane consideration” must 
be done “under all possible modes of production.” This is often seen as a pessimistic shift in 
Marx’s view of labor in a future society. Notice, however, that Marx does not describe such labor 
as alienated. On the contrary, he talks of freedom is necessary labor (“freedom in this field…”) 
and says that such labor can be completed “under conditions most favorable to, and worthy 
of…human nature.” Drudgery, we might say, must always be done. But it does not necessarily 
have to take on an alienated character. See Marx, Capital vol. III, in MECW vol. 37, 807. And for 
further discussion, Jan Kandiyali, “Freedom and Necessity in Marx’s Account of Communism,” 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no.1 (2014): 104-123.  
31 Marx, “Comments,” 227-228.  
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work fulfilling. In unalienated production I would enjoy an “individual 
manifestation of my life” during the activity.  This contrasts with alienated labor 
which, we have seen, is experienced as a torment and only performed out of the 
necessity of having to earn a wage. Second, the worker is said to experience a 
“pleasure” in knowing her personality to be “objective” and “visible to the 
senses.” Thus, in unalienated production I not only enjoy an individual 
manifestation of my life during the activity; I also enjoy the manifestation of my 
individuality in the product of my labor. Again, this contrasts with alienated labor 
under capitalism, where the worker’s objectification in the product of their labor 
“appears as loss of realization for the workers…as loss of the object and bondage 
to it…as estrangement, as alienation.”32 
If the first condition is concerned with individual self-realization, conditions 2) 
and 3) emphasize how the worker's act of self-realization satisfies another's 
need, and how that satisfaction of the other’s need contributes to the worker's 
own, as well as the other’s, flourishing. The second condition is relatively 
straightforward: A produces for B and that contributes to A’s flourishing. In your 
use of my product I gain the “immediate satisfaction” of knowing that I have 
produced an object that satisfies “the needs of another human being.”  
In 3) matters get more complex. There, Marx talks of producers and consumers 
completing one another in the production and consumption of the producer's 
product. 
Although the idea of mutual completion is not entirely clear, I think that what 
Marx has in mind can be reconstructed as follows. Suppose I am a producer and 
you a consumer. As we have seen, one of my ends in producing is my self-
realization: the manifestation of my individuality in and through my work. But a 
second and just as important end is to contribute a product or service that 
satisfies another's need. Now, since one of my ends is to satisfy another’s need, 
your use of my product or service to satisfy your needs also satisfies one of my 
ends. Hence, your use of my product or service can be described as the final step 
– the “completion” – of my production. But this completion is mutual because as 
a dependent being individually incapable of meeting your needs on your own, 
you need to be produced for by me. Thus, my production also completes you, for 
by providing you with the product or service you need, I help you attain your 
ends.  
Now, in most cases your needs could be met by many different producers. But 
part of what makes communist production “truly human” is that I have produced 
with the motivation of helping you satisfy your needs, and both you and I 
recognize this fact. That is, you appreciate the fact that I have produced for you, 
that I have helped you and intended to help you satisfy your needs. And I 
recognize that you appreciate my production for you, and the fact that I know 
that you appreciate my production provides me as a producer with another form 
 
32 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 272. 
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of fulfilment. As Marx puts it, I know myself to be “confirmed both in your 
thought and your love.”  
Now, in contrast to 1), it might not be clear why conditions 2) and 3) are not 
already satisfied under capitalism. After all, under capitalism people produce 
things that others use. One reply, commonly associated with the Frankfurt School 
but traceable to Marx, is that production under capitalism does not satisfy needs. 
Rather, capitalism inculcates, and then exploits, “inhuman, sophisticated, 
unnatural and imaginary appetites.”33 Under communism things are different. 
Rather than creating false needs to maximize profit, production will be directed 
only at the needs of another’s true nature.  
However, this can only be part of the answer. It is manifestly true, and Marx does 
not deny, that workers under capitalism produce things that other people 
genuinely need. In the “Comments”, however, Marx offers a different response. It 
is that although workers under capitalism produce things that other people use, 
they do not produce for others with the motivation of helping others satisfy their 
needs. Under capitalism “I have produced for myself and not for you, just as you 
have produced for yourself and not for me...That is, our production is not 
production by a human being for a human being as a human being, that is, not 
social production.”34 That is, A produces for B, not because A wants to satisfy B’s 
need, but because satisfying B’s need is a means for A to achieve some further 
valuable end. (Think of a doctor who treats his patients diligently, but only 
because he wants to make money and a reputation). Under communism, by 
contrast, I produce for you not only because I want to satisfy my needs (e.g., for 
my self-realization), but also because I want to help you satisfy yours. In a 
communist society – unlike a capitalist one – satisfying the needs of others is 
itself a motivation for productive contribution. 
This point should be made with care, however, for two reasons. First, Marx is not 
calling on us to forsake our interests and serve others. This would be an 
unrealistic and unattractive view on account of its self-denying nature. But it is 
not Marx’s view. His vision is of individuals realizing their individual interests 
through others – by helping them satisfy their needs. Marx does not want to 
overcome alienation by eliminating individuality.  
Second, we should be clear about the role of motivations in the account of 
unalienated production I have been developing. What I have said might be 
thought to imply that one could overcome alienated labor merely by changing 
one’s motivation. This, however, would make overcoming alienation too easy. To 
see this, imagine a factory that perfectly fits Marx’s description of alienated labor, 
 
33 Ibid., 307.  
34 Marx, “Comments,” 225. G.A. Cohen echoes this point: “the market motivates productive 
contribution not on the basis to one’s fellow human beings and a desire to serve them while being 
served by them, but on the basis of cash reward.  The immediate motive to productive activity in 
market society is (not always but) typically some mixture of greed and fear.” (G.A. Cohen, Why 
Not Socialism? 39). These are strong empirical claims. Defenders of the market argue that the 
motivation of market participants is more diverse than Cohen and Marx’s accounts suggest. For 
criticism of Cohen along these lines, see Hillel Steiner, “Greed and Fear,” Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 13, no. 2 (2014): 140-150.  
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but now imagine that, instead of producing only to satisfy their basic physical 
needs, workers gain fulfilment from the knowledge that their labor satisfies the 
needs of others. No doubt, Marx would see such motivational change as 
implausible, for he thought that when we produce under capitalism “the 
intention of plundering…is necessarily present in the background.”35 But putting 
this strong claim to one side, the relevant point here it would still only address 
one aspect of alienated labor. This work would satisfy and be intended to satisfy 
another’s needs, but, keeping other things fixed, it would not involve self-
realization (it would not enable us to exercise, develop and manifest or 
individuality), or be recognized by others, or be performed freely. As such, it 
would fall well short of unalienated production. For Marx, a change in motivation 
is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for overcoming alienated labor.36  
This brings us to the final theme of the passage: consumers’ appreciation of 
producers’ production. Marx claims that in capitalist society consumers do not 
recognize that others have produced for them.  Again, the point must be made 
with care. I take it that Marx’s point is not (implausibly) that consumers under 
capitalism are unaware that the goods and services they use – the coffee they 
drink at breakfast, the car they drive to work, the healthcare they receive – 
involve human labor. Rather, it is that they do not properly recognize – feel 
grateful for – the fact that other people have produced for them, i.e., with the 
motivation of satisfying their needs. (Of course, in Marx’s view, workers under 
capitalism typically do not produce with the motivation of satisfying needs; in 
this respect consumers’ beliefs about producers’ motivations are accurate). In a 
communist society, by contrast, consumers feel grateful for the fact that others 
have provided them with the goods and services they need, and producers 
recognize this, and this redounds to the fulfilment producers experience in their 
labor.37  
To get a fix on this vision of unalienated production, consider the following 
example, which I hope will serve as an illustration of Marx’s view and as a 
preliminary demonstration that it is not completely utopian. Consider a doctor 
who finds fulfilment in her practice of medicine and in the manifestation of her 
individuality. Although she is motivated by her own self-realization, she also 
wants to help others satisfy their needs. Indeed, the practice of medicine makes 
 
35 Marx, “Comments,” 225.  
36 That Marx thinks that a change in attitude is insufficient to overcome alienated labor is made 
clear in his critique of Stirner in The German Ideology. Stirner holds that the harmful aspects of 
the division of labor can be overcome by giving workers the knowledge of how to make the entire 
product. Marx lampoons this idea: ““Man” remains a maker of pin-heads, but he has the 
consolation of knowing that the pin-head is part of the pin and that he is able to make the whole 
pin. The fatigue and disgust caused by the eternally repeated making of pin-heads is transformed, 
by this knowledge, into the “satisfaction of man”” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in 
MECW vol. 5, 225).  
37 In the “Comments” Marx assumes that, if my labor is directed at X’s needs, then it is X who will 
feel grateful. But what about cases where the recipient is incapable of gratitude, as e.g., when one 
is caring for a new-born baby? To deal with such cases, Marx’s notion of recognition might 
require expansion beyond the producer-consumer model. I thank an associate editor for making 
this point. For an interesting attempt to revise the early Marx’s concept of recognition, see Daniel 
Brudney, “Producing for Others,” in The Philosophy of Recognition, eds. Hans-Christoph Schmidt 
am Busch and Christopher F. Zurn (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).  
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little sense to her without this.  Since helping a patient satisfy their needs is also 
one of her needs, her practice of medicine satisfies both her need for self-
realization and her need to satisfy the needs of others. It also, of course, satisfies 
the patient’s need. Now, the patient is aware that many doctors could have 
treated them. But what makes the care they receive better is that they recognize 
that the doctor wants to help them satisfy their needs. Recognition of this fact 
makes the patient feel grateful to the doctor. And the doctor recognizes that the 
patient feels grateful, and her recognition of this gratitude provides her with an 
additional form of fulfilment. 
Now, it might be objected that the example of the doctor is quite different from 
the standard case of commodity production. For it is a form of production that 
involves (1) a high development of human powers (2) in the service of another’s 
needs, where (3) it is relatively easy for the producer to know what the recipient 
of their service needs. As such, one might wonder how far the example 
generalizes. I return to this issue in §2.3 and §3.   
3.3. Freedom. – I now consider an aspect of Marx’s position that does not 
explicitly feature in the “Comments” but is, in my view, central to his vision of 
unalienated production. As we have seen, one part of Marx’s critique of alienated 
labor is that work under capitalism is only performed out of the necessity of 
having to earn a wage. For this reason, Marx describes alienated labor, in a 
passage I have already quoted, as “not voluntary, but coerced…forced labor.”   
Now, these remarks obviously imply that Marx thinks that unalienated 
production will be free in a way that alienated labor is not. Unalienated 
production will not be “forced” but “voluntary.” But in what sense? One answer 
can be found in the famous hunter-fisher passage in The German Ideology. There, 
Marx famously describes future individuals hunting in the morning, fishing in the 
afternoon, rearing cattle in the evening and criticizing after dinner.38 According 
to one interpretation of this passage, whereas work under capitalism is forced 
by the fact that workers have to earn a wage, individuals in a future society will 
enjoy enormous freedom to produce in any way they please, or, as Marx puts it, 
“just as they have a mind.”  
Attractive as this libertarian conception of society may sound, it has been 
criticized for blithely assuming that producers can develop their abilities as they 
please and yet cumulatively generate the products that society requires.39 On 
this view, people are said to hunt and fish because that is what they would 
independently choose to do, yet this is also said to fortuitously supply their 
fellows with the goods they need. But why should we have confidence that the 
free choice of producers will perfectly align with the needs of consumers?  
Now it might be thought, regrettably, that Marx’s position in the “Comments” 
faces this problem too. After all, that vision of a unalienated production 
emphasizes both producer freedom and the satisfaction of others’ needs. Thus, it 
could be that Marx of the “Comments” thinks that there will be a perfect match 
 
38 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 47.  
39 See note 17.  
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between these two elements. If that is right, then Marx’s position does seem 
unrealistic. However, I think that Marx’s view in the “Comments” is importantly 
different from this. In the “Comments” Marx describes a society where people 
achieve self-realization through others – by helping them satisfy their needs. In 
this society, people do not exercise their abilities “just as they have a mind,” 
which is to say, independently of their motivation to produce for others. Rather, 
the needs of others enter into producers’ considerations about how they should 
exercise their abilities. Like the hunters and fishermen of The German Ideology, 
people do what they want to do. But contrary to the apparent claims of that later 
text, what they want to do is to help others satisfy their needs.     
So, as I interpret Marx, production under communism is free, not in the sense 
that it unconstrained, but in the sense that it is performed freely.40 There are 
constraints on producer freedom, constraints that come from having to work in 
some ways and not others, in response to others’ needs.41 But these constraints 
are voluntarily accepted and affirmed, and, for this reason, not experienced as 
constraints. Indeed, responding to these constraints is enriching, part of the 
individuals’ good.   
Now, if I am right about this, then notice that the “Comments” does not face, as 
other interpretations of Marx do, a certain kind of coordination problem: there 
is no fortuitous alignment of producer freedom and consumer need, but a willing 
tailoring of producer freedom to satisfy others’ needs.42 
However, while my interpretation may seem more realistic in this respect, it may 
seem less realistic in another, for it relies on the idea that future individuals will, 
as I just put it, willingly tailor their abilities to help others satisfy their needs. 
Thus, whereas the hunter-fisher passage seems to rely on an unrealistic view of 
coordination, the vision of unalienated production in the “Comments” might be 
thought to rely on an unrealistic view of human nature, one that sees individuals 
finding fulfilment in satisfying others’ needs.   
There are, however, some things Marx can say in support of his view. For 
instance, he could point out that even under capitalism many people cite the 
satisfaction of others’ needs as a major source of meaning in their work.43 So it is 
 
40 For a similar distinction, see G.A. Cohen, “Are Disadvantaged Workers Who Take Hazardous 
Jobs Forced to Take Hazardous Jobs?” in History, Labor and Freedom, 243.   
41 Since a concern for others prevails, however, there is no need for these constraints to be 
backed by coercive force – at least not in the higher stage of communism. See note 73 for further 
discussion.  
42 My account of how economic activity could be coordinated without coercion or unfreedom is 
similar to G.A. Cohen’s response to the “freedom objection” in Rescuing Justice and Equality 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), ch.5. The freedom objection states that one 
cannot achieve equality and Pareto optimality without sacrificing occupational choice. In reply, 
Cohen argues that the objection overlooks the possibility that people might use their freedom to 
uphold equality and Pareto optimality. However, there is a difference in our positions. In Cohen’s 
account, people serve others out of duty. In my account, by contrast, people serve others partly 
out of a concern with their own individual self-realization. In this respect, my solution is less 
selfless, and, therefore, in my view, more plausible than Cohen’s.  
43 See Studs Terkel, Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About 
What They Do (New York: The New Press, 1972), xi.  
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not as though Marx is claiming that an aspect of motivation that is not known to 
us will miraculously emerge under communism. Rather, he is claiming that an 
aspect of motivation to work that is familiar to many of us will become stronger 
and more widespread under communism. Furthermore, he could point out that 
his view does not require us to forsake our individual interests to serve others, 
but rather calls on us to realize our own interests through others – by helping 
them satisfy their needs. Thus, it is not as though Marx’s ideal requires altruistic 
self-denial. Finally, he could point out that, while the prediction that people will 
produce for others under communism is based on a view of human nature, so is 
its denial. We have no basis for concluding that Marx’s view is false.44 
In closing this section, I emphasize a limitation of the foregoing discussion. I have 
addressed an objection that asks: how can people produce as they please and yet 
cumulatively generate the required mix of socially necessary outputs? I have 
argued that the objection rests on a misinterpretation of Marx’s view of future 
individuals’ motivation. Marx’s view is not that future individuals will produce 
as they please, but that they will willingly tailor their activities to others’ needs. 
However, a different coordination problem remains. For as well as the 
motivation problem addressed above there is also an information problem about 
how individuals can know what to produce, and in what quantity, at any given 
time, to satisfy human needs. My reply to the motivation problem does not 
answer the information problem, for even if future individuals are appropriately 
motivated to satisfy others’ needs, they will be unable to do so if they lack access 
to the relevant information. (Notice that the information problem does not arise 
in the example of the doctor I gave at the conclusion of §2.2, for unlike those 
engaged in the production of optional commodities, doctors can respond directly 
to needs).    
Now, the information problem generates some familiar open questions. In 
capitalist society a system of markets and prices solves the information problem: 
people produce on the basis of what they stand to gain, yet this also provides 
people with what they need. But is making decisions about what to produce on 
the basis of where one will make money compatible with the requirement that 
people produce with the motivation of satisfying another’s need? Can we 
preserve the information function of the market but eliminate, or at least 
mitigate, its motivational presuppositions?45 Could a society committed to 
concern for others accept the market on the grounds that it provides the most 
effective way for us to contribute to one another’s wellbeing?46 And if not, are 
there efficient ways of coordinating the production of the various goods and 
 
44 G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, 28.  
45 For an important attempt to do this, see Joseph Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the 
Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981).  
46 For this argument, see Daniel Brudney, “Overcoming the Market (Sort Of),” unpublished.  
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services without relying on markets in labor, goods and services?47 Like others, 
I do not know the answer to these questions.48 
4. Implications of Marx’s Vision of Unalienated Production  
In the previous section I developed an interpretation of Marx’s vision of 
unalienated production. This vision is appealing, but it leaves some questions 
unanswered. The aim of the present is to answer them. In doing so, I hope to 
bring out some of the vision’s major implications.   
4.1. Unalienated Production: A Definition. – Let me start with a more schematic 
definition of unalienated production. Based on the interpretation in the previous 
section, fully unalienated production can be defined as work that: 1) involves 
self-realization, i.e., the exercise, development and manifestation of our 
individual powers; 2) satisfies another's need; 3) is conducted with the intention 
of satisfying another’s needs; 4) is used and appreciated by that other; and 5) is 
performed freely.  Fully alienated labor, by contrast, can be defined as work that 
lacks these positive characteristics – that is, as work that 1) does not involve self-
realization; 2) is not intended to satisfy another’s need; 3) only satisfies 
another’s need contingently (if at all); 4) may be used but is not appreciated by 
that other; and 5) is not performed freely.   
With these definitions on the table, let me make three further points.  First, note 
that the idea of unalienated production – like alienated labor – has several 
distinct components, each of which is independent from the others, and each of 
which can be realized to different degrees.  My earlier example of the doctor 
provides an example of a service that scores high along all dimensions. But other 
forms of work will score high on some aspects but low on others. For example, 
various forms of drudgery will not enable us to exercise, develop and manifest 
our individuality, but might satisfy crucial human needs. Whether such work tilts 
towards alienated labor or unalienated production depends on how it scores on 
the other components – that is, whether it is conducted with the intention of 
satisfying another’s needs, whether it is properly appreciated by others, and 
whether it is performed freely. Alternatively, consider a sculptor who never puts 
her work on public display. Her work might score high on being performed freely 
and on enabling the exercise and development of her individuality, but low on 
satisfying others’ needs. Or consider once again the case of the doctor who is 
wholly motivated by money and reputation. His work enables the exercise, 
development and manifestation of his individuality, and it satisfies another’s 
need; but it lacks what Marx regards as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
of fully unalienated production: the motivation of satisfying others’ needs.  
Second, with regards to the different components of unalienated production 
ideal, note that some are objective whereas others are subjective and attitudinal. 
 
47 For some influential doubts about answering this question in the affirmative, see Alec Nove, 
The Economics of Feasible Socialism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983). Notice that the question 
asks whether there are efficient ways of coordinating production without markets. Such ways 
need not be as efficient as capitalism.  
48 See Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 63.  
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The objective components include the fact that one’s work expresses, develops 
and manifests one’s individuality, that it satisfies another’s need, and that it is 
performed freely. The subjective component includes the fact that unalienated 
production involves the motivation to satisfy another’s needs. As I have already 
argued, while the objective and subjective components are both necessary, 
neither is sufficient: unalienated production requires individuals to produce in a 
certain way and to do so with a certain motivation.  
Third, Marx thinks that we have not yet enjoyed a society with widespread 
opportunities for unalienated production. Why? In broad outline, Marx’s answer 
can be reconstructed as follows. In all societies, human beings must labor to 
satisfy their needs. In pre-capitalist societies, however, the low level of the 
development of the productive forces means that they do so with considerable 
toil. In such societies, most people are consigned to lives of drudgery. Their work 
might score high on satisfying another’s needs, but low on expressing and 
developing individuality and on being performed freely. Here, the major obstacle 
to unalienated production is the low level of technological advancement. 
Capitalism generates a far higher development of the productive forces than any 
previous mode of production. For the first time in history, unalienated 
production becomes a genuine possibility: the “material means of ennobling 
labor” are available.49 Yet, in Marx’s view, capitalism systematically frustrates 
the ideal of unalienated production that its own development put within reach.50  
To see why Marx thought this, consider his definition of capitalism as a mode of 
production in which the means of production are privately owned, workers own 
nothing but their own labor-power, and the goal of production is the relentless 
pursuit of profit. To begin with, because workers lack access to the means of 
production, they are forced to sell their labor-power to receive a wage. For this 
reason, Marx was unequivocal that capitalism is a system of “forced labor — no 
matter how much it may seem to result from free contractual agreement.”51 
Furthermore, because production under capitalism is driven by the pursuit of 
profit, work under capitalism typically takes on efficient but often unfulfilling 
forms; and scientific and technological advances, which have the “wonderful 
power of shortening and fructifying human labor,” are instead typically 
employed to increase output.52 Thus, in Marx’s view, workers under capitalism 
are not just forced to work; they are forced to work for long hours in unfulfilling 
jobs. Finally, because capitalism encourages people to produce on the basis of 
where they will make the most money, it tends to undermine or at least inhibit 
producers’ concern with satisfying needs. Work under capitalism may satisfy 
needs, but, in Marx’s view, this is a contingent fact about, rather than an explicit 
aim of, capitalist production. Far from being inessential to capitalism, then, Marx 
thinks that alienated labor flows from the very nature of a mode of production 
 
49 Marx, “Letter to the Labor Parliament,” in MECW vol. 13, 58.  
50 And the fact that capitalism’s developments put unalienated labor in reach partly explains 
why alienation under capitalism is especially acute. See Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx, 2nd edition 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 44-48.  
51 Marx, Capital vol. III, 807. 
52 Marx, “Speech at the Anniversary of the People’s Paper,” in MECW vol. 14, 655. For excellent 
discussion of capitalism’s output bias, see G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: An 
Interpretation and Defence, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1978), ch. XI.  
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where the means of production are privately owned, workers own nothing but 
their own labor-power, and the goal of production is the relentless pursuit of 
profit. 
4.2. Necessary Work. – I now emphasize an important feature of the Marx's vision 
of unalienated production, namely, that it is an account of self-realization in 
necessary work, where by necessary work I mean work that involves the 
satisfaction of others’ needs. Marx emphasizes self-realization: the exercise, 
development and manifestation of one’s individuality. Yet he argues that we only 
truly realize ourselves when our product satisfies another’s needs. Thus, for 
Marx, only work that satisfies needs can be fully unalienated.53 
This claim is philosophically distinctive. Philosophers before Marx emphasize 
self-realization (though they did not always use that term), but few saw meeting 
others’ needs as constitutive of it. In fact, philosophers before Marx generally 
considered meeting others’ needs as opposed to self-realization. For example, 
Aristotle famously argues that work directed at another’s need is “ignoble and 
inimical to excellence” because it is not done for its own sake and because it 
encroaches on the leisure time necessary for virtue.54 Thus, for Aristotle, the 
good life is incompatible with having to work to satisfy others’ needs. For Marx, 
by contrast, that we have to devote a significant amount of our time to meeting 
the needs of others is not a regrettable fact that we would be better off without, 
but properly seen, a positive feature of human existence. Indeed, it is the good 
life.  
The claim that only work that satisfies needs can be fully unalienated is also 
ambiguous, however, for what counts as “necessary” depends upon one’s 
conception of “needs”. What does Marx mean by “needs” and of “work that 
satisfies needs”? Here we can distinguish two different views. First, we might 
think of needs as things that are necessary for survival. On this view, our needs 
are for such things as food, shelter and warmth, and necessary work is 
production aimed at satisfying these survival needs. Secondly, however, we 
might think of needs as things that are necessary for creatures to realize their 
nature and flourish.55 On this conception, our needs include such things as food, 
shelter and warmth, but they also include (depending on one’s conception of 
human flourishing) such things as education, culture, recreation and aesthetic 
enjoyment. So, on this second conception, while necessary work includes 
production aimed at satisfying survival needs, it also includes production aimed 
at satisfying these less basic social and cultural needs.  
Now, Marx is sometimes interpreted as having the first view of necessary work 
– as work that satisfies survival needs. As such, he is often though to laud 
 
53 Of course, this is not to say that non-necessary activity has no value. On the contrary, Marx 
consistently emphasizes its importance. See, e.g., Marx, Grundrisse in MECW vol. 29, 97. 
54 Aristotle, The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
1328.  
55 For a sophisticated defense of a similar view, see David Wiggins, “Claims of Need,” in The 
Philosophy of Need ed. Soran Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).   
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material production.56 However, while there are passages that support this 
view,57 I believe that Marx’s considered view is the second view of necessary 
work – as activity that provides the goods and services that others need for their 
self-realization. The first view relies on a particular conception of needs, namely 
as things necessary for survival. This is a very narrow – even impoverished –  
view of needs to attribute to the early Marx.  It is inconsistent with the expansive 
conception of human need and human flourishing that runs through Marx’s early 
writings.58 For in those texts Marx rails against “bourgeois asceticism” for 
“reducing the worker's need to the barest and most miserable level of physical 
subsistence.”59 He describes communism, by contrast, as a society of “rich human 
being” and “rich human need.”60 The second view of needs – as things required 
to realize our nature – is more in the spirit of the early Marx’s thought.  
Let me note two implications of this. Notice, first, that interpreting “work that 
satisfies needs” as “work that satisfies what others need for their self-realization” 
has the consequence of including a wide-range of activities as potential vehicles 
of unalienated production. It includes work that involves the production of a 
physical object that satisfies another’s basic needs – the kind of work that Marx 
is often thought to laud. Yet it also includes work that involves the delivery of a 
service – the kind of work that Marx is often thought to neglect. It also includes 
socially useful activity that takes place outside the paid labor market, such as 
caring for the young or the elderly. Thus, although Marx talks of unalienated 
production, we should be clear that his conception is much broader than the 
concept of a “job” as it is conventionally understood, i.e., roughly, activity 
undertaken for remuneration.61  
Second, notice that this view of necessary labor does not rely on material 
abundance. The point is not simply that abundance is not mentioned in the 
“Comments,” but that what Marx says better fits a situation of moderate scarcity. 
62 As we have seen, Marx thinks that people realize their nature by providing 
 
56 See note 22.  
57 For instance, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx writes that “the history of 
industry and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man’s essential 
powers” (302).  However, Marx’s writings also contain many references to unalienated 
production that do not involve the transformation of the natural world. For instance, in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx refers to science as a form of work in which human 
beings realize their nature (298). In the Grundrisse Marx’s example of “really free work” is the 
composition of music (Marx, The Grundrisse, in MECW vol. 28, 530).  Likewise, in Theories of 
Surplus of Value, Marx describes Milton writing Paradise Lost as an example of unalienated 
production (Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, in MECW vol. 34, 530).  
58 For detailed discussion of the early Marx’s view of needs, see David Leopold, The Young Karl 
Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch.4.  
59 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 308.  
60 Ibid., 304. 
61 For a similarly broad interpretation, see Arthur Ripstein, “Rationality and Alienation,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 1 (1989): 449-466.  
62 It would be wrong to say that Marx’s vision is incompatible with abundance, for even in 
conditions of abundance there would be ways in which we could – indeed would have to – 
produce for others. For instance, abundance would not change the fact that for protracted 
periods of our lives we are dependent on others’ care for our survival and flourishing. For a 
critique of Marx’s failure to see this point, see Diemut Bubeck Care, Gender, and Justice, 23-32. 
For two recent statements about the essential but often undervalued role of care, see Elizabeth 
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others with the goods and services they need for their self-realization. Now, if 
God were to rain manna from heaven so that people’s needs were met without 
work, a significant number of producers’ self-realization would be undermined. 
These producers would not experience the fulfilment of satisfying another’s 
needs or the fulfilment of knowing that others appreciate their production. For 
them, fully unalienated production would be impossible. Far from presupposing 
abundance, then, the vision of unalienated production in the “Comments” 
presupposes something quite different: that people have needs that demand the 
production of others for their satisfaction.  
Now, the fact that the vision of unalienated production in the “Comments” does 
not rely on a premise of abundance makes it more realistic, in a major respect, 
than alternative accounts that rely on that premise. But dropping the premise of 
abundance also raises problems for my interpretation, problems that do not 
apply if the problematic premise is retained. One problem concerns the 
questions I discussed at the end of §2.3 – namely, whether a regime of 
unalienated production is compatible with the market, and if not, whether there 
can be an efficient organization of production without markets. In conditions of 
abundance, we need not worry about such questions: people can hunt in the 
morning, and fish in the afternoon, even if no one wants meat or fish. But once 
we drop the premise of abundance, the need for an efficient use of labor and 
other resources asserts itself. The same applies to the issues discussed in §1.3. 
about the overcoming of alienated labor. In conditions of abundance, no one has 
to deploy their energies on some socially necessary but inherently stultifying 
task. But without abundance, we must look to other answers in Marx’s texts to 
explain how the persistence of drudgery can be compatible with a regime of 
unalienated production. I return to this issue in the conclusion of the subsequent 
section.   
4.3. Specialization. – I now turn to an issue that does not explicitly feature in the 
“‘Comments” but is central to some of Marx’s other visions of communism, 
namely the future of the division of labor. I ask: is the vision of unalienated 
production in the “Comments” compatible with specialization, by which I mean 
compatible with a situation in which work is divided between various 
occupations, with individuals focusing on one or very few of these occupations 
for a reasonable length of time? 
Now the view that Marx’s vision of unalienated production is incompatible with 
specialization comes from a passage in The German Ideology that I have already 
discussed. There, Marx famously writes that in a society of the future individuals 
will “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize 
after dinner… without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.”63 
This passage has seemed to many to provide irrefutable evidence that a 
 
Brake, “Fair Care: Elder Care and Distributive Justice,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 16, no. 2 
(2015): 132-151; and Kimberley Brownlee, “The lonely heart breaks: on the right to contribute 
socially,” The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90, no. 1 (2016): 27-48. I thank an associate 
editor for encouraging me to clarify this point.  
63 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 47 
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communist society will abolish the division of labor. It has been harshly criticized 
as a result.64 
However, I doubt that Marx’s vision of unalienated production requires a total 
abolition of specialization. To begin with, note that while the “hunt in the 
morning” passage is nearly always read in this abolitionist fashion, it is more 
ambiguous about specialization under communism than is usually assumed. For 
much of Marx's ire in the above passage is directed not at specialization per se, 
but its involuntary character. The work of the proletarian is “forced upon him.” 
The labor in capitalist society is “involuntarily” divided. Whereas under 
communism, “each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes.” (my 
italics). These remarks imply that communism will not force people to be 
generalists but give people the freedom to not be specialists. In this respect, this 
passage's view on the division of labor is less clear-cut than it initially appears.65  
On top of this interpretive ambiguity, there are substantive reasons for thinking 
that Marx's vision of unalienated production is not incompatible with 
specialization.66 The main reason why Marx's vision of unalienated production is 
thought to be incompatible is that Marx sometimes emphasizes the need for a 
full development of one’s talents, and that such full development is often thought 
to require the individual to engage in multiple activities. However, this argument 
overlooks the extent to which complex occupations often require the exercise, 
development and successful integration of a wide-range of talents and abilities.67 
To return to my earlier example: a doctor needs to master a body of medical 
knowledge and develop a whole range of technical skills. Yet they also need to 
develop certain personal qualities to deal with their patients and get along with 
their colleagues. Even activities that are often thought to require a very high 
development of one skill often require the development and successful 
integration of several. For example, sports not only require the development of 
athletic abilities; they also require players to solve tactical and strategic 
problems.   
Furthermore, we should also remember how crucial it is for the Marx of the 
“Comments” that our production satisfies another’s need. If our production fails 
to satisfy another’s need, then, for reasons already given, our self-realization is 
incomplete. This means that, if self-realization is to be widespread under 
communism, it is essential that there is a close fit between production and 
 
64 See note 16.  
65 It also bears mentioning that serious doubts have been expressed about how far this passage 
reflects Marx’s considered view about the (lack of) division of labor under communism. See 
Terrell Carver, The Postmodern Marx (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 87-119.  
66 The argument of this paragraph is anticipated by Rawls’s Aristotelian Principle, which states 
that “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate 
or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater 
its complexity.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 374. 
67 It also overlooks the fact that performing multiple activities does not guarantee all-round 
development. Someone who turned screws in the morning, hammered rivets in the afternoon 
and pulled a lever after dinner may well develop fewer talents than a mere specialist in a 
moderately interesting job. See Jan Kandiyali, “Schiller and Marx on Specialization and Self-
Realization,” in Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy.   
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consumption. This further supports the view that Marx’s vision of unalienated 
production is not incompatible with, and indeed positively requires, 
specialization. For once we think that unalienated production involves, not just 
the development of one’s abilities, but the development of one’s abilities for 
others, then it seems highly likely that a communist society will require a division 
of labor to coordinate the proper distribution of responsibilities between 
workers so as to best achieve the goal – the satisfaction of another's need – that 
their individual activity aims at. Absent a division of labor, producers' and 
consumers' ends would surely be frustrated.  
I have been arguing that unalienated production is compatible with 
specialization, and I have given the example of a doctor to illustrate the 
possibility of a type of work that involves both the all-round development of 
one’s individual powers and the satisfaction of another’s needs. Not every 
specialization, however, is like that. For there are many forms of work that satisfy 
important needs but do not involve the all-round exercise and development of 
our individual powers. Examples might include the work done maintaining a 
sewer or sweeping the streets. The question is whether the persistence of these 
forms of drudgery undermines Marx’s vision of unalienated production. If Marx’s 
view is that unalienated production should be available to every individual, does 
the persistence of drudgery show that the ideal of unalienated production is 
unattainable?  
As I see it, Marx has three lines of reply to this objection, and in what follows I 
sketch two of them, and then explain why recourse to a third is necessary, before 
responding to an objection to this third reply.68 To begin with, Marx can say that 
some drudgery could be met through technical advances, thereby enabling 
people to spend more time performing more intrinsically interesting work. 
However, while it is certainly true that technological improvements can lighten 
the load of human labor (think, for example, of how housework has been reduced 
by washing machines, dishwashers, tumble-dryers, etc.,), and that it may 
continue to do so in the future, it is unrealistic that technology can provide a total 
fix to the problem of drudgery, not only because some jobs and services 
necessarily require human interaction but also because technology generates its 
own set of routine tasks (machines themselves have to be maintained, cleaned, 
repaired, and so on). Marx could also say that even when work itself is not 
intrinsically interesting, one could still gain fulfilment from the knowledge that 
one is satisfying another’s needs. However, while one might gain fulfilment from 
the knowledge that one is satisfying another’s needs, Marx accepts that people 
have their own individual interests, including an interest in their own self-
realization. As such, while they may be willing to perform some drudgery, and 
may even find it fulfilling, they will not want to perform it exclusively, at the 
expense of those interests. For this reason, drudgery may require a different 
treatment. The good point buried in the hunter-fisher passage is that, insofar as 
some socially necessary but inherently unsatisfying drudgery remains under 
 
68 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing this objection and Faik Kurtulmuş 
for many helpful conversations about my response to it.  
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communism, sharing it might be a reasonable way of responding to it.69 This 
would not be a society where people hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon 
and criticize after dinner, but one in which people spend some time away from 
their specialization doing something that has to be done, but that no one wants 
to do (at least exclusively). With regards to these forms of drudgery, abolishing 
specialization may indeed be an appropriate response. 
How does sharing drudgery respond to the objection? On the proposal I am 
imagining, everyone would now have to perform some drudgery. However, no 
one would be consigned to its exclusive performance. Consequently, everyone 
would have the opportunity to engage in other types of work, types that are more 
conducive to self-realization.70 Furthermore, everyone would know that the 
burden they bear is substantially the same as everyone else’s, and they would 
also know that it is a burden imposed on them by nature, not unjust social 
relations. In these conditions, it is more likely that people would perform their 
share of drudgery freely. And if this were so, drudgery would then take on a more 
(though not fully) unalienated character.  
However, while sharing drudgery provides a response to the original objection, 
it might be objected that it does so at an unacceptable cost.71 For I have now 
conceded that a  regime of unalienated production could only be realized by 
implementing a system of shared drudgery that would seem to place significant 
restrictions on various freedoms—for example, the freedom to choose one's own 
job and career, to live where one pleases, to move to another part of the country, 
to emigrate, and so on. Are these restrictions morally acceptable?   
Now in reply, notice that the significance of the restrictions on freedom depends 
on the quantity of drudgery that remains.  If there is a lot of drudgery, the 
restrictions on freedom will be great, whereas if there is less drudgery, the 
restrictions will be comparably lighter. As we have seen, Marx predicts that a 
good deal of drudgery will be automated in the future, and some of the literature 
 
69 One might wonder whether these replies are in tension with each other. If (as I have argued) 
we can gain fulfilment from the knowledge that socially necessary drudgery satisfies human 
needs, why insist that such drudgery should be shared? The answer is that even if we can derive 
fulfilment from the knowledge that our drudgery satisfies needs, this is not to say that we will 
want to perform it exclusively. For example, I do not mind changing my son’s nappies. It is a 
constitutive part of a fulfilling activity. But it does not follow that I want to do it exclusively. There 
is no tension here.    
70 For a strong defense of sharing routine labor, see Gomberg, How to Make Opportunity Equal, 
75-91. For a more cautious defense, see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism 
and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 165-184.    
71 In what follows, I focus on the cost to freedom. However, one might also worry about 
economic efficiency. Is sharing socially necessary drudgery compatible with an efficient 
organization of production? In reply, notice, first, that my response only calls for sharing 
drudgery that no one (exclusively) wants to do. It does not call for – indeed I have argued against 
– sharing all work. Thus, my account does not fall foul of the usual list of counter-examples, e.g., 
being operated on by an amateur surgeon. Second, it is hard to know what the cost, in terms of 
efficiency, of sharing drudgery might be. I am inclined to think that it would not be prohibitive. 
But even if it is significant, it might be a cost that people would be willing to endure if there are 
counterbalancing benefits in other values. Efficiency is important, but it is, as G.A. Cohen puts it, 
“only one value, and it would show a lack of balance to insist that even small deficits in that value 
should be eliminated at whatever cost.” (G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 73.) 
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on automation supports his prediction.72 Even if – as I accept – technological 
advance cannot eliminate drudgery, it might reduce it. And if it does, the 
objection would have less force.  
More importantly, notice that the objection assumes that sharing drudgery can 
only be achieved by limiting people’s freedom. However, in the vision of 
unalienated production in the “Comments” that I have been explicating, labor is 
performed freely. (Why would people perform drudgery freely? Maybe because 
they recognize the importance of such work, or because they derive value from 
satisfying needs, or because they see that their share is fair and that performing 
it gives everyone opportunities for unalienated production). According to this 
view, there is no restriction of freedom, since the performance of socially 
necessary drudgery does not involve coercion but flows from people’s free 
choice about how to exercise their abilities.  
It is only fair to admit, however, that there are passages in which Marx suggests 
that the sharing of socially necessary drudgery will be coercively imposed, at 
least for some people, and at least for some length of time, as for example when 
he writes in Capital that under communism labor will be “more and more evenly 
divided among all the able-bodied members of society… [as the bourgeoisie are] 
deprived of the power to shift the natural burden of labor from its own shoulders 
to those of another layer of society.”73 However, drudgery has to be done under 
all modes of production. There is no collective freedom from drudgery.74 In 
capitalist society, those who lack wealth and desired skills are forced to toil.75 
Under communism, by contrast, the burden is shared by all. In such a society, we 
all must perform some drudgery. But no one has to perform it exclusively. There 
is unfreedom here, for there is coercion and some people only labor in response 
to it. But in Marx’s view these short-lived restrictions on freedom are counter-
balanced by the liberation of others from a life of drudgery.76  
5. Revisiting the Objections  
 
72 See, e.g., David H. Autor, “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of 
Workplace Automation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, no. 3 (2015): 3-30.  
73 Marx, Capital vol.1, in MECW vol. 35, 530. Is this view incompatible with the view put forward 
in the “Comments”? In Capital it is implied that people will be drafted, military-style, into 
necessary labor, whereas in the “Comments” it is implied that the sharing will proceed on a 
voluntary basis. This tension can be overcome, however, if the two models apply successively to 
the lower and higher phase of communism. On this view, the military-style drafting of necessary 
labor applies to the lower phase. In this phase, coercive enforcement is necessary, for capitalist 
attitudes to work prevail. In the higher phase, by contrast, people are willing to play their part in 
the collective reproduction of their society, and the need for coercive enforcement withers away.   
74 For the concept of collective freedom, see G.A. Cohen, “The Structure of Proletarian 
Unfreedom,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 1 (1983): 3-33.  
75 That is, they have no reasonable alternative but to toil. See G.A. Cohen, “Are Disadvantaged 
Workers Who Take Hazardous Jobs Forced to Take Hazardous Jobs?”, 245-254.  
76 For an interesting account of freedom in the lower phase of communism, see Lea Ypi 
“Democratic Dictatorship: Political Legitimacy in Marxist Perspective,” European Journal of 
Philosophy (forthcoming).  
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Having provided an interpretation of Marx’s vision of unalienated production, 
and drawn out some of its implications, I now return to the objections with which 
I began and show how my interpretation can respond to them.  
(i) Full Development. – The first objection was that Marx’s conception of full 
development is an infeasible and not necessarily desirable conception of self-
realization: infeasible because it is not possible to realize all of one’s abilities 
within a single lifetime; not necessarily desirable because someone who tries to 
develop all their abilities will not develop any of them to a satisfying aptitude. 
My interpretation of Marx provides two replies to this objection. First, I have 
argued that one can achieve an all-round development of one’s abilities by 
specializing in certain complex activities, such as medicine. Second, I have argued 
that the vision of unalienated production in the “Comments” most likely requires 
specialization because once we think of producers as being centrally motivated 
to help others satisfy their needs, they will most likely adopt a division of labor 
to coordinate their activities to ensure that everyone’s productive contribution 
achieves that end. In this way, I hope to have shown that Marx’s concern with all-
round development is a feasible ideal, and that a concern with such development 
does not commit Marx to the unrealistic and not necessarily attractive idea of 
abolishing specialization.  
(ii) Free Development. – The second objection was that it is implausible to think 
that people can produce as they please and yet cumulatively generate the variety 
and quantity of goods that society needs. I have argued that this objection rests 
on a misinterpretation of Marx’s position. Although Marx holds that people will 
deploy their abilities freely, his view is not that such deployment fortuitously 
meets the needs of others. Rather, it is that producers will adjust their individual 
activity to meet the needs of others. There is no fortuitous alignment between 
producer freedom and consumer need, but a willing tailoring of individual 
abilities to meet others’ needs.   
(iii) Alienated Labor. – The third objection was that Marx’s claim that alienated 
labor can be overcome is implausible because there will always be a significant 
amount of socially necessary but intrinsically undesirable work to be done. 
However, I have argued that alienated labor is not merely drudgery. Thus, the 
claim that alienated labor will be overcome does not entail that there will be no 
socially necessary but intrinsically undesirable work to be done: sewers will 
have to be maintained, and streets will have to be swept, under communism as 
under all modes of production.  
However, we have seen that a revised version of this objection might continue to 
be pressed against Marx. For it can now be objected that it is hard to see how the 
existence of drudgery can be compatible with unalienated production. My 
interpretation provides two main answers to this revised objection. First, I have 
argued that even if one’s work is drudgery, one can still find fulfilment in the 
knowledge that one is satisfying human needs (as well as from the gratitude from 
others for satisfying their needs). Thus, even the clearest forms of drudgery need 
not lack all value to those performing them. Second, I have argued that Marx 
envisioned communism as a society in which socially necessary drudgery is 
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evenly divided between people. Consequently, everyone would have 
opportunities for other types of work, and everyone would also know that their 
quota of drudgery is roughly the same as everybody else’s. Thus, although 
drudgery will have to be done under communism, Marx thinks that the 
knowledge of its worth, and the fact that it is shared fairly between everyone, 
ensures that it will not be overly burdensome. Such work will never be “life’s 
prime want”, but it is not implausible that, under these conditions, it could be 
viewed as part and parcel of human existence. 
 (iv) Abundance. – The fourth objection was that Marx’s vision of unalienated 
production relies on a premise of abundance, a premise that ensures that no one 
must deploy their abilities on some socially necessary but inherently unfulfilling 
task. This premise is said to be unreasonable. However, I have argued that the 
early Marx’s vision of unalienated production does not rely on a premise of 
abundance. In fact, it presupposes that people have needs that demand the 
production of others for their satisfaction. Thus, the objection that Marx’s vision 
of unalienated production relies on an unreasonable premise of abundance, 
however relevant it may be to Marx’s other statements about communism, is not 
an objection to the account he develops in the “Comments”.  
(v) Productivism. – The fifth objection was that for Marx only material production 
– work that transforms nature to satisfy survival needs – constitutes unalienated 
production. This claim was said to be arbitrary, for there is no good reason to 
favor material production over other forms of work. However, I have argued that 
work that satisfies others’ needs should be interpreted in a broad way, as work 
that provides the goods and services that others need for their self-realization. 
This interpretation entails that both material production and non-material, 
service-orientated work can constitute unalienated production.  It also entails 
that self-realization is possible outside the sphere of production, for example in 
leisure and in family.   
 (vi) Sexism. – The sixth objection was that Marx’s vision of unalienated 
production is sexist because Marx interprets “labor” as the production and 
exchange of objects. Consequently, he excludes the work which has been 
traditionally performed by women, such as housework and care work. However, 
my interpretation sees unalienated production as work through which we 
realize ourselves by providing others with the goods and services they need for 
their self-realization. This can involve the production and exchange of objects, 
but there is no reason why it only involves the production and exchange of 
objects.  
To see this, let us briefly consider the examples of housework and care work, 
which are claimed to be the kind of work that Marx excludes from the category 
of labor but which, I shall now argue, can be paradigms of unalienated 
production. To begin with, housework and care work can satisfy the first criteria 
Marx describes: that we enjoy the exercise of our individuality during the activity 
and its manifestation in our product or service. For while both housework and 
care work are sometimes described as drudgery, this surely relies on an 
underestimation of the work involved. In truth, housework and care work call on 
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the development and integration of a far greater number of abilities than many 
factory or office jobs. Furthermore, housework and care work centrally involve 
the satisfaction of another’s needs. As such, they allow for the fulfilment that 
comes from satisfying human needs, and of having one’s work recognized and 
appreciated by others.77 Far from excluding the experiences of women, then, the 
interpretation provided here suggests that the work that has traditionally been 
performed by women can potentially be a paradigm of unalienated production.78 
 (vii) A Liberal Objection. – The seventh objection was that unalienated 
production is not necessarily a desirable goal, for although some people value 
unalienated production, others value other things more. Consequently, they may 
want to perform alienated labor if it allows them to acquire other goods, like 
higher wages or better leisure. As such, Marx’s drive to implement unalienated 
production unfairly privileges some people (who value unalienated production) 
over others (who do not).  
My interpretation provides three main replies to this criticism. The first concerns 
the breadth of unalienated production. Like other liberal egalitarian critics,79 
Kymlicka interprets Marx’s vision of unalienated production in a narrow way, as 
activity that takes place inside the sphere of production.  He criticizes Marx’s 
account for overlooking the fact that some people may derive greater fulfilment 
from exercising their abilities outside this sphere, for example in leisure or 
family.80 This is an important point. However, my interpretation can 
accommodate it. For as we have seen in §3.1, my interpretation is not limited to 
activity that constitutes a “job” as it is conventionally understood. It allows that 
self-realization can occur in leisure and in family.  This means that some of 
Kymlicka’s counter-examples do not present a problem for my view. For 
instance, one of Kymlicka’s less esoteric examples involves a parent who wishes 
to forego unalienated production to spend more time caring for their child. While 
Kymlicka presents this as an example of someone trading unalienated 
production for something else (better leisure?), my interpretation views it – 
more plausibly I think – as someone moving from one form of unalienated 
production (in the labor process) to another (in the family). I am not, therefore, 
committed to the claim that such an individual has made a “bad” choice.  
My second reply concerns freedom. Liberal egalitarians like Kymlicka identify 
Marx as a perfectionist who has a vision of unalienated production for human 
beings that can only be realized through coercion and the unfair privileging of 
 
77 But see note 37 for a qualification of this point.  
78 To say that housework and care work can be unalienated is not to say that they always are. 
Housework and childcare can lend themselves to self-realization and can satisfy and be intended 
to satisfy human needs. However, they will not be fully unalienated unless they are also properly 
appreciated and performed freely. See Phillip J. Kain, “Marx, Housework and Alienation,” Hypatia 
8, no.1 (1993): 121-144.  
79 Arneson also interprets unalienated production in a narrow a way: he defines it as “work that 
is interesting, that calls for intelligence and initiative, and that is attached to a job that gives the 
worker considerable freedom to decide how the work is to be done and a democratic say over 
the character of the work process and the policies pursued by the employing enterprise.” 
(Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism,” 522).  
80 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 198 n.11. 
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some people’s preferences. However, while Kymlicka is right to identify Marx as 
a perfectionist, he overlooks the fact that Marx’s vision of unalienated production 
also emphasizes freedom (see §2.3.). In particular, I have argued that Marx’s 
vision of unalienated production is upheld not through coercive force but 
through people’s free choices about how to exercise their abilities. This 
prediction relies on a view of human nature. However, I have also argued that 
this view is not as implausible as is commonly supposed. If it is true – if, as Rawls 
says, “what men want is meaningful work in free association with others”81 – 
then Kymlicka might have overlooked an important possibility: that a regime of 
unalienated production could be upheld without coercion and without unfairly 
privileging some people’s preferences.82  
My third reply concerns the distinction between alienated labor and drudgery 
(§2.1).  Like other liberal egalitarian critics,83 Kymlicka misinterprets alienated 
labor. Kymlicka defines alienated labor as work that does not give the worker a 
say over how it is organized and is devoid of “intrinsic satisfaction”.84 He then 
provides a number of counter-examples that purport to show that many people 
might choose “alienated labor” over unalienated production, for example when 
they can get the resources they need to play tennis from two hours of alienated 
labor as opposed to four hours of unalienated production. These counter-
examples rely on the dubious premise of “alienated labor” commanding higher 
wages than unalienated production. But putting that to one side, the relevant 
point here is that Kymlicka’s definition overlooks important aspects of alienated 
labor. Kymlicka’s definition picks out the idea that alienated labor does not 
involve self-realization. But it misses the fact that such labor is not performed 
freely, not undertaken to benefit others, and not appreciated by those others. 
These aspects, key to Marx’s account of alienated labor, are absent from 
Kymlicka’s definition. Indeed, what Kymlicka calls alienated labor is not 
alienated labor at all; it is what I have called drudgery. 
Now, Kymlicka’s misinterpretation of alienated labor helps his case against Marx 
in two ways. First, it enables him to portray Marx as prohibiting some relatively 
benign forms of labor, i.e., those lacking “intrinsic satisfaction.” Once we see what 
 
81 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 257.  
82 But what if Marx’s view is false, i.e., what if some people value certain goods more than 
unalienated production? Then it will be true that implementing a regime of unalienated 
production would privilege some people’s preferences over others. Notice, however, that the 
same could be said about positions liberal egalitarians support, such as the public funding of 
political parties or the collective provision of healthcare. For while some people value these 
goods, others do not. If they were given the choice, some might prefer to trade these goods for 
more income and wealth. Because of the importance they attach to these goods, most liberal 
egalitarians would – rightly in my view – not take these counter-examples as a decisive objection. 
So why should Marxists should take Kymlicka’s counter-examples as a decisive objection to their 
support for unalienated production? Interestingly, Arneson accepts this point in a more recent 
paper on this topic; see “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism Revisited,” Analyse & Kritik 31, 
no. 1 (2009): 139-151.  
83 Arneson also misinterprets Marx’s concern with alienated labor when he locates its badness 
with the “rote, boring, meaningless quality of many of the unskilled and semiskilled jobs 
prevalent in modern industrial economies.”  (Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market Socialism,” 
517.)  
84 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 187.   
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alienated labor really involves, however, there are several things we can say, in 
reply to Kymlicka, as to why preventing its performance does not constitute an 
unacceptable restriction on freedom. For instance, we can say that abolishing 
alienated labor does not constitute an unacceptable restriction on freedom, 
because one is only being prevented from a harmful option, and preventing 
harmful options does not limit freedom.85 Or we may concede that the abolition 
of alienated labor constitutes a restriction of freedom, in the simple sense that 
one option that was previously available is now closed, but say that this 
restriction is justified because the option is harmful, and because there is a 
concurrent increase in more valuable options, such as the option to engage in 
unalienated production. Furthermore, we could also point out that many writers 
in the liberal tradition have supported similar prohibitions on harmful activities, 
such as selling oneself into slavery and consuming harmful drugs. Finally, we can 
also say that because my interpretation of unalienated production is broad, and 
because alienated labor is not a catch-all for every type of drudgery, the abolition 
of alienated labor leaves many options open about how to exercise one’s abilities. 
Abolishing alienated labor does not amount to the coercive imposition of a highly 
specific vision of the good life.   
Second, Kymlicka’s misinterpretation of alienated labor also helps him evade 
difficult questions about whether it is right to permit alienated labor. As other 
commentators have noticed, Kymlicka has a rather optimistic view of human 
activities: for him “there are good activities, there are less good activities, and at 
worst there are trivial activities, ones with no positive value.” 86 But once we see 
that some forms of labor are not just valueless but harmful, then difficult 
questions emerge. Should we allow people to spend their whole life in work that 
is, in Rawls’s words, “deadening to human thought and sensibility”?  Should we 
allow people to spend their lives in jobs that might be not only individually but 
also socially damaging?  Should we allow some people to be used as a mere 
means for the production of others’ goods and services? Marx’s clear answer to 
such questions is “no”. Kymlicka’s optimistic assessment of modern working 
conditions enables him to bypass these questions altogether. 
6. Conclusion  
In this essay I have provided a new interpretation of Marx’s vision of unalienated 
production. Central to my interpretation is the idea that unalienated production 
consists in realizing oneself through providing others with the goods and 
services they need for their self-realization. I have not argued that this 
interpretation answers all the objections one might raise against it. But I have 
tried to show that the vision is appealing, and that it provides us with a better 
response to objections than previous interpretations. In doing so, I hope to have 
put Marx’s concern with alienation and non-alienation back on the table, and to 
have invited further discussion on the important issues that it raises.  
 
85 As, e.g., Locke argues in The Second Treatise on Government, Chapter VI, Section 57: “that ill 
deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices.”  
86 Thomas Hurka, “Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 3, no.1 (1995): 44.  
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